The Whole Mandate and Nothing but the Mandate

In the recent case of K.S. c. Curateur public du Québec, 2017 QCCA 59, the Québec Court of Appeal confirmed the Superior Court’s refusal to homologate a mandate in case of incapacity and thereby clarified an issue that had been an ongoing source of debate among estates law practitioners.

In this case, the Appellant’s mother had signed a mandate in case of incapacity pursuant to article 2166 CCQ in 1992. The mother had appointed both her daughter (the Appellant) and her son to act as mandataries in the event she became incapacitated. Specifically, the mandate outlined that her son and daughter were to act as mandataries “de concert”. Complications arose in 2014 when the son passed away. The mandate neither addressed this possibility nor was it modified following his death. When her mother later became incapacitated, the daughter asked the Superior Court to homologate her mother’s mandate, and to designate her as the sole mandatary for her mother. The daughter argued that “it was her mother’s intent that it be so”.

Relying on the case of Québec (Curateur public) v. D.S., 2006 QCCA 83, the Superior Court judge refused to homologate the mandate and appoint the daughter as the sole mandatary. The Court reasoned that to do so would effectively modify the terms of the mandate, which the Court was not empowered to do. As such, the Court determined that a curatorship was the appropriate protective measure in light of the mother’s incapacity, and designated the daughter as the provisional curator to the property and person of her mother. Unsatisfied with this designation, the daughter appealed.

In a brief judgment, the Québec Court of Appeal confirmed the Superior Court judgment and added the following:

[16]  Le Tribunal, sur une demande d’homologation, « ne vérifie que la légalité de cet acte; il ne peut se prononcer sur l’opportunité ou le fond de l’acte » (C.p.c., art. 528). Il ne peut recevoir une preuve dont l’objet est d’interpréter le mandat, encore moins si le but est d’en modifier les termes.

[17]  On ne peut faire le parallèle avec l’interprétation d’un contrat où le Tribunal recherche « la commune intention des parties » (C.c.Q., art. 1425), alors que celles-ci participent au débat et administrent toute preuve pertinente relative aux circonstances de sa négociation et de sa signature. Mais tel n’est pas le cas ici où le mandat résulte de la volonté intime d’une seule personne.

[18]  Le Juge ne pouvait présumer des intentions de la mère advenant la disparition prématurée d’un de ses mandataires et décréter que l’autre pourrait agir seule.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that courts can only choose to homologate or not to homologate a mandate in case of incapacity. Courts cannot deviate from its terms. Lawyers and notaries would therefore serve their clients well by ensuring that their mandates plan for every eventuality in order to avoid the difficult situation where their incapable client is left without an enforceable mandate.